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Abstract In this paper, I argue that (non-presentist) endurantism is incompatible with
the view that properties are universals. I do so by putting forward a very simple
objection that forces the endurantist to embrace tropes, rather than universals. I do not
claim that this is bad news for the endurantist—trope theory seems to me by all means
more appealing than universals—rather, I would like to see this result as a further
motivation to embrace tropes. I then also put forward a (more controversial) reason to
believe that at least some versions of perdurantism also require tropes rather than
universals.
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In this paper, I argue that (non-presentist) endurantism is incompatible with the view
that properties are universals. I do so by putting forward a very simple objection that
forces the endurantist to embrace tropes, rather than universals. I do not claim that
this is bad news for the endurantist—trope theory seems to me by all means more
appealing than universals—rather, I would like to see this result as a further motiva-
tion to embrace tropes. I then also put forward a (more controversial) reason to
believe that at least some versions of perdurantism also require tropes rather than
universals.
Tropes are spatio-temporal objects. The trope theory's rival universals view comes
in two versions: either it claims universals to be abstract (non-spatio-temporal,
platonic) objects or on the contrary, concrete (spatio-temporal, immanent) ones. It is
the latter option, of an Armstrongian type, that I will be concerned with in this article.
The debate between tropes and immanent universals opposes two views on the nature of
properties that are different but that have in common the idea that properties are spatio-
temporal entities—these are the two views that I am interested in comparing here.
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The story starts with the well-known objection to endurantism from tempo-
rary intrinsics (see Lewis 1986 (p. 202-205)). Take the case of an apple: it is first
green, say at time t1, and later it is red, say at time t2. According to endurantism, in
this situation, there is one and numerically the same entity—the apple—that exists
wholly both at t1 and at t2. This entity has both the properties of being green and of
being red, and this is why Lewis has charged endurantism with a contradiction. To
avoid this worry, endurantists have various strategies available, namely indexicalism,
adverbialism, or relationism. In this article, I shall focus on indexicalism and
adverbialism.1
The indexicalist strategy, such as developed in the work of Peter Van Inwagen (see
Van Inwagen 1985, 1990, 2000), claims that all properties are always time-indexed.
In our case, the apple does not have the property of being green, and neither has it the
property of being red. Instead, it has the properties of being-green-at-t1 and being-red-
at-t2—again, the idea here is that there are no properties like "being green simpli-
citer", the only properties there are, are always and only time-indexed ones. This is
how the endurantist can easily answer Lewis' objection, since time-indexed properties
such as these are simply not contradictory.
Suppose we accept this line of response—this is where we get to the point I wish to
stress. Indeed, such time-indexed properties are tropes, rather than universals, for
such properties are always "time-bound," in the sense that they cannot be exemplified
at any other time. And of course, not only do properties have to be time-bound, but
they have to be space-time-bound as well. The need for this is most salient in the case
of a time-travel scenario. Let us send our apple back in time from t2 to t1. At t1, it then
has both the properties of being-green-at-t1 and being-red-at-t1—a contradiction. But
of course, the same remedy we have seen above can be applied here as well: just
claim that all properties are always space-time-indexed, in which case, any threat of a
contradiction is easily avoided, in the same way as before.
This situation, and this way that the endurantist has to deal with it, strengthens the
claim I want to make to the effect that such properties are tropes. Indeed, any such
space-time-indexed properties are bound to one particular space-time location, and
are thus not multiply locatable. As a consequence, they cannot be universals, and they
have to be tropes.
One might object here that such space-time-indexed properties could be instanti-
ated by other things: although this-and-this particular space-time-indexed property is
not actually instantiated by anything other than its actual bearer, something other
could have had that property. Indeed, say that our apple has the space-time-indexed
property of being-green-at-l1-t1 (where "l1" stands for a spatial location) in the actual
world. If we allow for identity or counterparts of spatio-temporal locations across
worlds (which is not an easy thing to do, but let us grant that point here), there is then
the possibility that another other-worldly object has the property of being-green-at-l1-t1
1 Endurantist Relationism is the view according to which whenever an object has a property F, it actually
stands in a relation—a relation between the object and a time t. This has the significant disadvantage to
explicitly make all properties that we thought to be monadic and intrinsic, like having a big nose, relations
to times (which also seems to carry a stronger ontological commitment to times, as entities, than the other
endurantist views). These relations may well be universals, and my argument in this article thus does not
apply to this particular endurantist view.
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in another world. But even if we grant this, this does not make the property in
question to be a universal. A universal is an entity that is multiply instantiable in one
world—and this possibility is simply ruled out for space-time-indexed properties.
There is no possible world where the property of being-green-at-l1-t1 is instantiated
twice.
As a consequence of all that was said above, it appears that if one follows
endurantist indexicalism, one has to endorse the view that properties are tropes rather
than universals.
What about endurantist adverbialism (which is the other option an endurantist can
take when facing Lewis' objection) ? Such a solution has been defended, for instance,
by Johnston (1987) and Haslanger (1989). The adverbialist will not understand the
apple's being green at a time t1 in terms of its having a time-indexed property, rather
she will suggest that it has the property of being green in a temporally modified way.
Thus the adverbialist will say that the apple is t1-ly green and t2-ly red (see Johnston
1987 (p. 129)). Since all properties, according to this view, are always had tn-ly, the
Lewisian objection is easily answered since it is not contradictory to say that an object
is green in one way (i.e. t1-ly) and red in another way (i.e. t2-ly).
What plays a crucial role in the adverbialist story is then the relation of exempli-
fication. It has to be a real and ontologically loaded relation (and not just a "non-
relational tie" with no genuine ontological commitment), since it has to be the bearer
of the temporal adverbial(ist) modification, and since it plays a crucial role in the way
objects have their properties. And while it is true that the adverbialist is not forced to
see properties like "being green" or "being red" as tropes, she has to acknowledge that
the relation of exemplification has to be a trope, for reasons similar to those given in
the case of indexicalism, since it always has to be space-time-indexed. Now, of course,
the adverbialist could claim that the relation of exemplification is a trope, while other
properties are relations are universals—as a logical possibility, this is indeed an available
option to her. But once she has to accept that at least one type of (relational) properties
have to be tropes, it seems to be more natural to endorse the idea that all properties are
tropes, instead of holding a 'mixed view' where some properties are tropes and others
are universals.
What about perdurantism2 ? Perdurantism is the view that objects like apples
persist through time not by being wholly present at different times, but by having
temporal parts at different times, and so the view does not have to worry about any
threat of contradiction arising from the having of incompatible intrinsic properties at
different times since the incompatible properties are simply had by (numerically) different
things—different temporal parts of the apple. In fact, it is because perdurantism spatio-
temporally indexes objects (temporal parts) that it does not have to face this worry and
does not have to index properties. Thus, the view is compatible with both properties as
universals and as tropes.
Or so it seems. I shall now try to show that the perdurantist who is a bundle theorist
does have to embrace tropes rather than universals (for a different reason than the
traditional complaint that the bundle theory with universals faces serious problems
with Identity of Indiscernibles).
2 I have here the ‘worm view’ in mind, but what I say can be easily applied to the ‘stage view’ as well.
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According to this bundle theoretic perdurantist view, our apple is a bundle of
bundles, as pictured on the following figure.
There are (say, for simplicity, instantaneous) temporal parts that are bundles of
properties like F ("being round"), G ("being green"), and R ("being red"). These
bundles are time-indexed, but the properties are not. The apple is then a bundle of all
of his temporal parts, a four-dimensional space-time worm.
But now, suppose we start to cut one of the temporal parts into metaphysical
pieces. Perdurantists typically embrace unrestricted composition so they shouldn’t
worry too much about this. It’s like cutting an instantaneous but spatially extended
object into spatially smaller objects, except that here we go even further and keep
cutting until we reach the ultimate metaphysical components of the instantaneous
object – single properties. So, we will end up with
which seems to be nothing more than a time-indexed property. The idea here is
simply that components of an indexed bundle automatically inherit the index. It's like
if you have a group of three people, John, Jane and Jim, and you say "they are
crooks"—by saying this, you say that John is a crook, Jane is a crook, and Jim is a
crook. Similarly, if you say about properties F, G, and R "they are all at l1-t1", you say
that F is at l1-t1, and so F is space-time bound, and so it is a trope.
Probably not all ways of understanding the bundle theory will accommodate
the idea that one can "cut up" a bundle into metaphysical pieces. Such a
manoeuvre will only sound right to those who take the properties of a bundle
to be its constituents in a way similar to how parts constitute wholes (a very
good defence of such a view can be found in Paul 2002). But even if one is not
convinced by this idea of inheritance of the index, at least it has to be accepted that,
similarly to the case of the adverbialist, the perdurantist who is a bundle theorist has
to accept that her central piece of metaphysics, namely the relation of compresence,
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has to be a trope, rather than a universal. Indeed, in the figure above, the compresence
relation is graphically represented by the circle and the index, but if we write it down
we have
F G R
are compresent with one another at l1-t1
which makes it clear that at least the compresence relation has to be space-time
bound and non-multiply located. (So, as before in the case of the adverbialist,
one could try to defend a mixed view (tropes and universals), or one could more
naturally say that properties are tropes, since one has to accept the existence of tropes
anyway.)
As a cumulative effect of the arguments above, I hope I have succeeded in
showing that when one considers the most interesting options with respect to the
problem of persistence through time and the issue as to how objects have their
temporary intrinsic properties, tropes seem to fit the bill better and more naturally
than universals.3
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